Moreel v Emergency Services (Fort Saskatchewan) Ltd. et al., 2026 AHRC 55
May 5, 2026
What happens when a former employee files a disability discrimination complaint, only to discover that the corporate respondent has been struck from the registry? In Moreel v Emergency Services (Fort Saskatchewan) Ltd. et al., the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal allowed the complainant to add the company’s director and owner as a personal respondent – a decision that reinforces the principle that individuals who participate in discriminatory decisions cannot shield themselves behind a defunct corporate entity.
The ruling turns on the well-established Sigrist two-part test and offers practical guidance on when directors and owners may face personal liability for workplace discrimination. For employers and business owners alike, it is a reminder that dissolving or abandoning a corporation does not make a human rights complaint go away.
Background
The complainant was a former employee of Emergency Services (Fort Saskatchewan) Ltd. She alleged disability-based employment discrimination contrary to section 7 of the Alberta Human Rights Act. However, by the time the complaint was proceeding, the corporate respondent had been struck from the provincial corporate registry – meaning the company no longer existed as a legal entity capable of responding to the claim.
Faced with a complaint against a shell that could neither defend itself nor satisfy any eventual remedy, the Director of the Alberta Human Rights Commission applied to add a director as a personal respondent. The proposed director was also the owner of the corporate respondent, and had been present at the termination meeting that was central to the complaint.
The director opposed the application. He argued that his role was limited to operational matters and that his presence at the termination meeting was merely as a witness – not as a decision-maker. In essence, he sought to characterize himself as a passive bystander who happened to hold the title of Executive Director and Owner.
The Decision
The Tribunal applied the Sigrist two-part test for adding a personal respondent. The first branch asks whether the facts alleged, if proven, could support a finding that the proposed respondent contravened the Act. The second branch asks whether adding the respondent would cause substantial prejudice to their defence.
On the first branch, the Tribunal found that the Director’s presence at the termination meeting – combined with his identification as “Executive Director/Owner” – was sufficient to ground a potential finding of personal involvement in the alleged discrimination. The Tribunal was not required to determine at this stage whether the Director actually made the termination decision; it needed only to be satisfied that the facts, taken at their highest, could support such a finding. They did.
On the second branch, the Tribunal found no substantial prejudice to the Director’s ability to defend himself. He was aware of the underlying complaint, he had knowledge of the relevant events, and adding him as a respondent at this stage would not deprive him of any meaningful opportunity to respond. The proceedings were not so far advanced that his late addition would be unfair.
The Tribunal also noted a significant contextual factor: the corporate respondent’s struck status. With the company no longer on the registry, there was no functioning corporate entity capable of participating in the proceedings or satisfying a remedy. This reality made the addition of a personal respondent not merely appropriate but practically necessary to ensure that the complaint could be adjudicated on its merits.
Key Takeaways
- Directors and owners can be added as personal respondents when they participate in allegedly discriminatory decisions. Holding a title like ‘Executive Director’ or ‘Owner’ while being present at a termination meeting is precisely the kind of factual basis that will satisfy the first branch of the Sigrist test. Business owners who involve themselves in employment decisions should understand that personal exposure follows.
- A struck or dissolved corporation does not extinguish human rights liability. The corporate veil is not a disappearing act. Where a company ceases to exist – whether by voluntary dissolution, administrative striking, or insolvency – tribunals will look to the individuals behind the entity. Owners who walk away from their corporate obligations may find that the complaints walk with them.
- The threshold for adding a respondent is low. The Sigrist test does not require proof of discrimination at the application stage. It requires only that the alleged facts, if proven, could support a finding. This is a deliberately permissive standard, and proposed respondents who challenge it on the basis that they were ‘just a witness’ or ‘only handled operations’ will often fail.
- Early engagement is the best defence. The Director’s opposition to being added as a respondent was unsuccessful in part because the Tribunal found no prejudice to his defence – he knew about the complaint and had access to the relevant facts. Ironically, individuals who engage early in the process are better positioned to argue prejudice if an application to add them comes late. Avoidance, by contrast, tends to undermine that argument.